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ARTICLE
GOMORRAH TO YBARRA AND MORE:
OVEREXTRACTION AND THE PUZZLE OF
IMMODERATE GROUP LIABILITY
Saul Levmore*
INTRODUCTION

MAGINE that you are jostled in an office building elevator and
you sense that your wallet, with $100 in it, has been taken.
There are five fellow passengers in the elevator, and as the door
opens a police officer stands before you. The officer is sympathetic

to your problem, but is unable to narrow the group of suspects in
order to carry out a search. None of the five suspects volunteers to
be searched. There is the possibility that the victim could be made
whole by a recovery of twenty dollars from each of the five sus-

pects.' We might think of such liability as a form of communal
responsibility, familiar since the Biblical story of Sodom and

Gomorrah,2 where this kind of remedy, affecting the innocent
along with the culpable, has been described by some commentators
* Brokaw Professor of Corporate Law and Albert Clark Tate, Jr. Professor, University
of Virginia. I am grateful for comments received from Clay Gillette, Jim Lindgren,
Thomas Sachson, Robert Scott, Bill Stuntz, Rip Verkerke, and participants at faculty
workshops at the University of Virginia and Chicago-Kent Law Schools.
1 The analysis is facilitated by the assumption of facts that make us certain that the
victim lost $100 to a pickpocket. We might imagine that immediately prior to boarding, the
victim purchased a newspaper, and witnesses report the victim's receipt of change from a
$100 bill.
2 Genesis 18:22-19:29.
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as reflecting the responsibility of the community for the wrongdoing within it.3 A modem, perhaps more functional, justification for
this kind of joint liability is that it might encourage otherwise silent
witnesses to help identify the chief culprit who would then bear the
entire liability (and perhaps criminal punishment as well).
This kind of "information forcing" rule, or explanation for a rule,
may have peaked with medieval frankpledging, whereby small
groups of (at least ten) individuals forfeited their bonds or deposits
when one of their number escaped arrest for a crime.4 Yet it is5
surprisingly similar to the famous case of Ybarra v. Spangard,
where a patient was able to recover from a number of health professionals for an injury sustained during an operation. The facts
suggested that one (unidentified) defendant negligently caused the
injury, and the decision can be read as hinting that a plaintiff
should not go uncompensated simply because doctors and nurses
may be unlikely to testify against one another and identify the
wrongdoer.6 Ybarra is not a startling case, although it represents a
3 See David Daube, Two Notes on Communal Responsibility, 36 Soc. Rev. 24 (1944)
(describing Abraham as reacting to communal responsibility, or the idea that a community
is tainted and punished for the crime of a member, with the suggestion of communal merit,
whereby a community might be saved on account of at least a number of righteous
inhabitants, and contrasting these with ruler responsibility, under which a community
suffers as the property of a guilty ruler). Even the first description in the text may have too
much of a functional ring to it, because the ancient taint may have nothing to do with
"responsibility" in the sense of ability to monitor and to correct. There are, however, other
ancient references that reflect a kind of responsibility or even vicarious liability. See Saul
Levmore, Rethinking Group Responsibility and Strategic Threats in Biblical Texts and
Modern Law, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (forthcoming 1995) (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association). In any event, a plausible reading of the Sodom and Gomorrah story
is not that Abraham bargained down the degree of communal responsibility, but rather
that there were simply no good people to be found in the doomed cities. And even if the
story does assume communal responsibility, it is hardly the case that many suffered for the
deeds of a few, but rather that a few may have suffered for the deeds of the many. For
these reasons I proffer this story not as the best example ancient law has to offer but rather
as a famous (possible) example and as a convenient way of referring to Professor Daube's
interesting article.
4 See William Alfred Morris, The Frankpledge System (1910).
5 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944).
6 Id. at 689 (stating that the "patient... would be entirely unable to recover unless the
doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to disclose the identity of the negligent
person"); see also Dierman v. Providence Hosp., 188 P.2d 12, 13-15 (Cal. 1947) (using res
ipsa loquitur in plaintiff's favor, apparently influenced by a nurse's vague testimony and by
the failure of defendants to produce evidence in their control which might have resolved
uncertainty regarding cause of injury).
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minority view, and yet there is something startling about applying

its principles to force passengers in an elevator to compensate a
pickpocket victim. 7 We sense that these passengers will not, and
should not, be held liable. One goal of this Article is to understand the limits of Ybarra and the occasional attraction of placing
calculated burdens on the innocent and culpable alike.
If Ybarra is an example of shrewd, judge-made law because of its

information-forcing potential, 8 then a more clever rule would not

only encourage witnesses but also persuade the wrongdoer to con-

fess or to right the wrong. If the Ybarra-style rule calls for each of
the five suspects to pay twenty dollars, then we might contemplate

a radical rule requiring all six passengers to pay more than $100
each, perhaps $150, into the hands of a police officer or other third
party. 9 This stakeholder would return all funds if the stolen wallet

and money are immediately returned, but otherwise would give it
all to a charity or to the government, where it might be earmarked

for crime-fighting or prison construction. The scheme would only
be used when there appeared to be no other means of identifying

the wrongdoer and imposing criminal or tort penalties. The idea is
to make the thief an offer that will not be refused. If the thief
keeps the wallet, the thief loses the $150 "overextracted" by this
immoderate group liability rule;10 if the thief returns the wallet,
7 See infra Part I.A. I think it fair to say that Ybarra is even well regarded in the sense
that if it should turn out to force information most of the time, then most observers would
regard it as a good decision. Alternatively, Ybarra may be regarded or even applauded as
simply balancing the "conspiracy of silence" among professionals, see W. Page Keeton,
Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton & David G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts § 39, at 253 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser and Keeton], even if there is no
expectation that the threat of liability will bring out information. This latter view of the
"group liability" in Ybarra does not impede the analysis in the text, but it makes Ybarra
less like the overextractive rule presently described.
s The idea, once again, is that liability may help overcome the disinclination of health
professionals to testify against one another.
9 The rule in the text includes the victim as one of the passengers required to contribute.
Part II discusses the amount of the victim's payment (and other details of the scheme).
10 1 use the term "group liability" to refer to liability that falls on a group which includes
some blameless members. Communal responsibility is the traditional expression for this
sort of remedy or punishment, but communal responsibility is usually thought of as
applying to a large group such as a tribe or city. The group liability referred to in this
Article is usually a kind of "joint liability," but I try to use group liability as a subset of
joint liability. Finally, the expression "Ybarra-style liability" is synonymous with group
liability, although the discussion in Part I.B emphasizes that Ybarra is in fact but one
relatively small source or subset of such liability.
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then the thief enjoys the $150 returned from the stakeholder. The
rational thief will presumably return what has been stolen, spending $100 to make $150. When the thief responds "rationally," all
passengers receive their money back. Thus, the success, and perhaps even the popularity, of this "overextraction rule" depends
rather plainly on the empirical question of how often pickpockets
will return wallets and how much crime will be deterred in the first
place once potential wrongdoers know that the rule will preclude
gainful theft.
There are obvious (and subtle) mechanical and conceptual
problems with this overextraction idea, and the discussion in Part
II explores these problems and the details that must be incorporated into a successful overextraction scheme. I advance the overextraction idea as a thought experiment, both because virtually all,
readers will (at least at the outset) abhor this overextractive rule
and because what is most interesting about it is not the promise of
its sensible application (which is probably limited), but the puzzling
lack of experimentation with such a rule and the implications for
more modest group liability that flow from it." Even where
"group liability" is likely to be popular, as in charging a number of
businesses for the costs associated with cleaning up a polluted site,
there is no thought of imposing overextractive charges in order to
elicit rational confessions from wrongful polluters. I hope to show
that we can learn about law by asking why the overextraction idea
(such as demanding $150 from each passenger in the elevator) is
not used to resolve uncertainty and to deter wrongdoing.
Part I begins with the scope of group liability in contemporary
law. I aim to show that there is much more Ybarra-like liability in
law than first meets the eye. Part II returns to the overextraction
alternative introduced above. I emphasize that many of the
problems that can be associated with overextraction are also found
where Ybarra-like joint liability is used. The absence of overex"I
have also explored the use of group liability in ancient, and especially in Biblical,
law. Generally speaking, ancient and medieval lawmakers are reported to have been much
less reserved than modem legal systems about employing group liability, even though the
innocent suffered along with the guilty. Nevertheless, even in these older legal systems,
there are virtually no obvious examples of the extension of such liability or punishment to
the overextraction point where the rational wrongdoer will confess. In subtle forms,
overextraction might be found in the story of Jonah and elsewhere. See Levmore, supra
note 2.
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tractive liability is therefore somewhat puzzling because it has
many advantages over more modest group liability. Part III concentrates on the questions of why the overextraction idea is unattractive, or at least untried, and why the more modest Ybarra rule
has spread only in certain directions. I suggest that the development of overextraction remedies may have been arrested by antipathy toward uninsurable risks and fears of destructive threats and
that to explain the absence of overextraction rules may also be to
understand the scope of (Ybarra-like) group liability in law.

I.

GROUP LIABILITY IN CONTEMPORARY LAW

A.

The Doctrinal Limits of Ybarra

Ybarra v. Spangard itself is of uncertain precedential value. A
number of courts have explicitly rejected its holding even in virtually identical medical malpractice settings.' 2 Other courts have
adopted or followed Ybarra but, by focusing on the need for liability to overcome the "shroud of silence" among health providers,
suggested that the rule may be limited to medical malpractice
cases. 13 An information-forcing rule may also be regarded as especially productive in the medical setting because potential defendants do or could monitor one another. Alternatively, medical
patients might be seen as having a special, if implicit, contract or
relationship with those who provide medical treatment.
If Ybarra is confined to hospital settings, it is of limited precedential importance because in such situations it will often be the
case that the plaintiff can sue the hospital and through vicarious
liability overcome the defense that the identity of the actual wrongdoer is unknown. If the hospital is vicariously liable for all its
employees, then the plaintiff will win when it is clear that an injury
12 See, e.g., Barrett v. Emanuel Hosp., 669 P.2d 835 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting idea
that anything can be inferred from mere occurrence of injury); Talbot v. Dr. W.H. Groves'
Latter-Day Saints Hosp., Inc., 440 P.2d 872 (Utah 1968) (holding that numbness in arm
following operation does not establish sufficient causation to reach defendants because
nonnegligent causes also possible).
Although it is conventional wisdom, and probably sensibly so, to view Ybarra as less
than universally followed, it is noteworthy that cases just like it do not seem to arise very
often. In Barrett, for example, although the court never mentions the possibility that
plaintiff's injury is questionable, the complaint, alleging mental and nervous disorders
arising out of a knee operation, is likely to arouse suspicion.
13 See, e.g., Van Zee v. Sioux Valley Hosp., 315 N.W.2d 489, 494 (S.D. 1982).
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was caused by some employee in the operating room and that all
present in the operating room, aside from the patient, were hospital employees. Indeed, in Ybarra itself, where some of the "suspects" were not employees of the hospital, the court implied that it
would be prepared to hold that these non-employees were nevertheless agents of the surgeon, so that vicarious liability would solve
the plaintiff's doctrinal difficulty. 4 In any event, even if Ybarra is
limited only by the contract or special relationship idea, that would
be enough to keep it from spreading to our elevator passengers and
to many other settings where an information-forcing rule might be
useful.
In NOPCO Chemical Division v. Blaw-Knox Co.,15 the plaintiff
took delivery of a damaged machine that had been handled by
three unrelated parties after it left the manufacturer's control. The
plaintiff had hired one of these parties to transport the machine
from its manufacturer to a storage facility owned by a second
party, where it would remain until the plaintiff's factory was readied for the new equipment. The third party was chosen by the
plaintiff to transport the machine from this storage facility to the
plaintiff's factory floor. The machine was somewhere damaged by
the negligent operation of a forklift. The defect was sufficiently
hidden by protective coverings so that no one would have seen the
problem when receiving the machine from the previous handler.
The New Jersey Supreme Court decided the case in the plaintiff's
favor, declaring that it Was unfair to burden the plaintiff with the
nearly impossible task of proving who damaged the machine.' 6
NOPCO would seem to outflank Ybairra, because the NOPCO
defendants were less likely than those in Ybarra to have information about one another's behavior; there was no implicit contract
with the group of defendants; there was no particular reason to
fear a "conspiracy of silence" among defendants; and there was not
even the possibility (as there was in Ybarra) of judicial sympathy
for a plaintiff whose claim of vicarious liability might normally
have succeeded. NOPCO's imposition of group liability, despite
the plaintiff's inability to satisfy the usual preponderance-of-theYbarra, 154 P.2d at 690.
15 281 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1971).
16 Id. at 797.
14
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evidence standard against any defendant, might be defended as
serving to elicit exculpatory evidence from a given defendant about
its own behavior, even if it could not be expected to force out
information about the behavior of fellow defendants. Put differently, if in Ybarra the defendants had not all been in the operating
theater at once but rather had come and gone from the plaintiff's
bedside one at a time, liability would have been much less likely.
And NOPCO is at best a nonmedical version of just such a variant
of Ybarra, and at worst (for future defendants) very differefit
because in NOPCO there is no sense in which liability might
"really" be of the vicarious kind. The doctors and nurses in Ybarra
may all have been working for the hospital (in fact if not in law),
but the defendants in NOPCO were individually selected by the
plaintiff and had no ongoing contractual relationship with one
another.
Unsurprisingly, NOPCO is rarely cited' 7 and is one of the few
judicial decisions to go beyond Ybarra in imposing group liability.
More representative is Samson v. Riesing,'8 where responsibility
for salmonella poisoning was not placed- on the eleven defendants
who had all prepared turkeys- or worked on the turkey salad for a
school picnic. At least one of the defendants was probably negligent, but there was little chande that the fhreat of liability would
have forced out useful information; nor were the defendants
related in a way that would have warranted bending the requirements for vicarious liability.' 9 I suspect that even the New Jersey
Supreme Court would have resisted imposing liability in NOPCO

17 Three other cases governed by New Jersey law cite NOPCO: Raritan Trucking Corp.
v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1972) (agreeing that language in NOPCO
suggests that its holding could be limited to situations involving a bailee for purposes of
transportation); Shackil v. Lederle Lab., 561 A.2d 511 (NJ. 1989) (refusing to impose
NOPCO group liability based on market share for injuries arising out of vaccinations); and
Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d 1 (NJ. 1975) (placing actual burden of proof on defendant
medical team, hospital and manufacturer of forceps).
18 215 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 1974).
19 Put differently, the common interest of these defendants could provide a source of
vicarious or other liability, but schools, clubs and other organizations would become
insurers and would pass along premium costs contrary to popular preferences. See infra
text accompanying notes 71-75 (linking Ybarra-style liability to the presence of businesses
rather than uninsured individuals).
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had the wrongdoer been hidden in a group of ten rather than two

innocent people.2 °

B.

The Real Scope of Ybarra

There is, however, much more group liability than first meets the

eye when the identity of the wrongdoer is uncertain. I have
already alluded to the first reason for this conclusion by implying
that Ybarra may be of limited precedential importance because in
so many like cases the plaintiff will succeed with a claim based on
vicarious liability, even though it is impossible to identify the

wrongdoing agent.2 ' Put simply, the doctrine of vicarious liability
often places liability on an innocent member of a "group."

Products liability law is perhaps the most important reason for
my description of the real scope of Ybarra. If an automobile
20 Indeed, the other cases that expand upon Ybarra involve just two or three defendants
so that the "error costs" of shifting the burden of proof are low. Compare Jackson v.
Magnavox Corp., 280 A.2d 692 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (emphasizing that
uncertainty as to liability is narrowed to two defendants) and Litzmann v. Humboldt
County, 273 P.2d 82 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (refusing to exonerate two possible
wrongdoers because of uncertainty in action against the alleged wrongdoers and the county
which sponsored the fair at which explosion took place) with Clift v. Nelson, 608 P.2d 647
(Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (denying action against crowd of onlookers absent particularized
showing of personal culpability).
21 The philosophical link between group liability and vicarious liability is noted in
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group
Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1473, 1477 (1986)
(arguing that vicarious liability, absent negligent supervision, clashes with notions of
individual responsibility).
One practical link between vicarious and group liability is that courts can find that one
defendant was the agent of another. Compare NOPCO Chemical Div. v. Blaw-Knox Co.,
281 A.2d 793 (NJ. 1971), where the plainfiff chose to deal with each of the defendants,
with General Electric Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 160 F.Supp. 186 (W.D. Pa. 1958), where
damage to transported refrigerators could have been caused by any of three defendants (or
even two unnamed carriers), and the court was content to let the named defendants
exonerate themselves or implicate one another. The facts suggest that each carrier might
have chosen the next, and there is therefore the likelihood that the court thought of the
defendants in principal-agent terms. Another case along these lines may be Jackson v.
Magnavox Corp., 280 A.2d 692 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971), where the plaintiffs were
injured when their car ran into a negligently parked trailer. Magnavox, which had goods to
be hauled, was to have returned the trailer to a second defendant, Merit, which had done
the hauling. It was unclear whether the trailer had been returned to Merit before the
accident, but it was certainly not in the control of a third defendant, a railroad, which had
the general lease on the trailer. The jury was told to find against Magnavox or Merit.
Again, these defendants might be seen as participating in an agency relationship.
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explodes, a victim may collect from the manufacturer of this apparently defective product without pointing to the precise component
(and therefore subcontractor) of that product that was negligently
made and that caused the explosion. Products liability law looks to
the least-cost avoider-where that expression refers not only to
direct precautions but also to the ability to contract with other precaution takers. Indeed, once we recollect that the historical, doctrinal obstacle in the way of products liability was lack of privity
between consumer and manufacturer, it is easy to see that in the
absence of that obstacle vicarious liability and products liability are
close relatives. 22
I am suggesting that in many cases where there is uncertainty
about the identity of the wrongdoer, or at least where this uncertainty can be reduced to the point where there is a mere handful of
suspects (some of whom may be nonculpable so that the uncertainty is not simply about which of a number of wrongdoers caused
the injury in question), vicarious liability or products liability doctrine permits recovery, and often serves to spread the costs of the
loss across the "community" or target group in which the actual
wrongdoer is most narrowly found. This is precisely what Ybarra
did in the operating room, but that case was difficult only because
it did not involve a product and, apparently, because the formal
hierarchy necessary to trigger vicarious liability was absent. Potential plaintiffs, which is to say all citizens who do not know whether
the negligence that may one day cause them some injury will come
from a defective product or from a group of doctors (who may or
may not work for one another or for a common hospital), ought to
regard Ybarra as a relatively small part of the law's nonuniversal
willingness to find liability where the actual wrongdoer is unidentified. Vicarious liability and products liability are far more important developments in this regard. Put differently, if we opted for
Ybarra-style liability in our elevator case, so that each passenger
22 This comparison suggests that the exception in vicarious liability law for independent
contractors is somewhat puzzling because this is, in a sense, the precise relationship of the

maker of a component part to the manufacturer of the automobile. In any event, both
vicarious and products liability can raise prices among suppliers and otherwise lead to cost
sharing in the manner of Ybarra. In turn, indemnification agreements can refocus the
burden of liability but this is also the case in Ybarra, where indemnification agreements,
like, insurance contracts, are presumably enforceable.
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paid twenty dollars to the victim, the case would still be of relatively limited impact because so many cases of comparable uncertainty are already decided in the plaintiffs' favor as a result of
vicarious liability and products liability law.
There is also a more dramatic and less doctrinally driven reason
to think that group responsibility, as in Ybarra, is commonly the de
facto rule when the identity of the (causal agent and) wrongdoer is
uncertain.3 When victims are repeat players, they will generally
be able to share losses with other innocent players and perhaps
with a group that includes both innocents and unidentifiable
wrongdoers. Thus, shoplifting raises prices in a way that forces all
shoppers (including most shoplifters, who are likely to acquire
some of their goods through normal purchases) to bear the cost of
this crime; tax fraud probably imposes costs on all citizens and
surely on all taxpayers; and unsolved burglaries and many other
crimes impose costs on all property owners. The costs of some
crimes and torts are borne more broadly than others but the point
is that in the long run the cost of undeterred wrongdoing is shared
by many innocent people through higher prices and taxes, the costs
of taking precautions, and the hidden costs of avoiding certain
activities or locations.
In the case of the pickpocket on the elevator, there is less potential for loss sharing because there is little repeat playing. Once the
wrongdoer has struck, passengers are unlikely to agree to share the
loss (much less agree to a less moderate group liability rule) even
though some of these passengers might have agreed on such a
scheme ex ante, before they knew who among them would become
the victim. To the extent that many passengers would agree ex
ante to an Ybarra rule or more, there is of course the familiar argument for imposing (legislatively or judicially) that which citizens
would bargain for in the absence of transaction costs. Some measure of group responsibility may satisfy this criterion.
If most passengers would in fact decline an ex ante opportunity
to opt in to an Ybarra-style rule, they might do so because of a
kind .of confidence or fear of the moral hazard that some of their
23 Broad and formal (as opposed to de facto) community responsibility is not unknown.
The most serious examples of group liability involve wars fought because of the behavior
or interests of a part of the population. For a discussion of this aspect of group liability, see
Levmore, supra note 2.
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fellow passengers are more likely, or will now be more likely, to
fall prey to the pickpocket than they.2 4 It is no accident that more
people purchase insurance covering the theft of their automobiles,
for example, than purchase traveler's checks or other forms of
pickpocket insurance. Even in a world without insurance many
people might decline to share losses more than they must, but the
point is that a great deal of sharing will occur naturally. In its simplest form, this sharing comes from repeat playing, so that the elevator case may be unusual because it is a scenario that is not often
repeated with the same passengers. If it were repeated, it would
make little difference whether the apparent rule was no liability or
Ybarra, or whether passengers agreed ex post or ex ante or even
through insurance contracts to share in the losses. In the long run,
given the pervasiveness and costs of crime, group liability is the de
facto rule for people who work or live near one another.
The same is true of many torts. If we are unable to identify the
polluter of a waterway, we might eventually resort to a tax on, or to
assigning cleanup costs to, nearby factories, or to an industry as a
whole. When these costs are borne by taxpayers, recreational
users, or consumers of fish, it is apparent that innocent people are
forced to pay for the wrongs the law could not or chose not to
assign. As the target group is narrowed, the private incentive to
help identify the wrongdoer increases, yet even in the absence of
identification, greater liability falls on the actual wrongdoer. At
the same time, however, more innocents are made to pay in a way
that may seem both distributionally unfair and likely to generate
inefficient activity-level effects as these innocents try to keep their
distance from liability.
Majoritarian tastes and power generate "natural" group liability.
Some people may not agree to group responsibility as they enter
the elevator, but most people (or their elected representatives) will
24 Some people may guard their valuables less jealously than others. And some people
carry around a great deal more money and jewelry than others. Most insurance schemes
require larger premiums for larger risks. One might try a scheme such as that represented
by general average contribution in admiralty law, in which all passengers on the elevator
contributed according to the value of what they brought onto the elevator, but it would be
impossible to carry out this plan without searching all the passengers, and uncertainty
would be inevitable because such searches cannot be required. In other settings it would
simply be difficult to combine the principles of general average contribution and
overextraction.
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agree to some sharing of this kind when faced with certain social
problems caused by wrongdoers who are difficult to identify. At
one level there are rules that resolve uncertainty by imposing liability on industries and subsets of citizens. Environmental cleanup
charges and minimum driving and drinking age laws are examples
of these broadly imposed costs. But at a less refined level there is
almost no end to the list of measures that can at least in part be
described as spreading costs in the manner of Ybarra. Many taxes,
affirmative action plans, curfews and reporting requirements can
be viewed in this way. In all these cases we might well choose to
impose liability on known wrongdoers if we could do so costlessly;
it is in the face of uncertainty that we share burdens more widely
for reasons of deterrence or compensation or both.25 If Ybarra is
about providing some deterrence (even if only at the activity level),
some insurance, and some incentive to report wrongdoing by
others, then an enormous amount of government regulation can be
described as of a piece with Ybarra. If there was something
remarkable about the decision in Ybarra, perhaps it was simply the
fact of its judicial rather than legislative origins.
If the scope of group liability is accepted as quite great, and
Ybarra as just one small piece of this reality, then the question
becomes not so much why and when we employ group responsibility, but rather why and when we do not always refine such liability
by even more regularly imposing it on well-defined narrow target
groups. One answer appears to be that we shy away from such
"refined" group liability when the narrow target group lacks the
contractual links that may normally be a proxy for repeat playing.
Although NOPCO remains the doctrinal outlier, it is perhaps more
defensible under this view than any other because the plaintiff is
contractually linked to the defendants, even though there is no
repeat playing.
A second factor in deciding between Ybarra (or vicarious liability or products liability) and broader group liability (through taxes,
price increases, and other nonjudicial means) builds on an important difference between refined and de facto group liability. Both
25 These goals normally lead to some narrowing of the target group. Thus, curfews are
sometimes imposed on those under a specified age. And in taxing cigarettes and alcohol,
we may be pleased if one effect is reduced consumption (and therefore reduced external
effects).
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types of group liability impose costs on innocent players, but only
refined, case-oriented liability offers compensation to (uninsured)

victims. A plaintiff who cannot point precisely to the wrongdoer
who caused his injury may be compensated through products liability law, vicarious liability law, or occasional decisions such as
Ybarra and NOPCO. But when the claim falls into none of these
categories, the fact that there may be ultimate loss sharing because
of taxation schemes or simply through repeat playing does little for

the victim in a given case. The point is not to extol the advantages
of refined group liability, but rather to illuminate the line between
refined and de facto group liability by observing that without compensation there is no incentive to report losses dishonestly.26 The

court in Ybarra seemed certain that the injury was inflicted in the
operating room,

7

and the NOPCO court emphasized that the

plaintiff could not have damaged the equipment in question.'

But

in many cases there will be reason to fear false claims if group lia-

bility provides compensation.29 In a sense, this explanation is but
one step removed from the question of why we do not regularly
use rewards (rather than the threat of Ybarra liability, for example) to encourage witnesses.30
Finally, a third explanation for the apparent preference either
for no liability or for broad (and moderate) group liability over
refined, Ybarra-style liability relates to risk aversion, or the taste

26 If there are insurance schemes in place, there will of course be compensation and
similar incentives to manufacture claims. But first-party insurance will control some false
claims through deductibles and experience ratings.
27 Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 689-90 (suggesting that the patient was at all relevant times in the
exclusive control of the defendants).
28 NOPCO, 281 A.2d at 795-96 (stating that source of damage discovered by
manufacturer's field engineer and plaintiff established that the damage most likely
occurred in transit).
29 The discussion in Part m.C extends this argument in considering the likelihood of
false accusations.
30 The moral hazard associated with rewards relates to the danger that reward-seekers
will help create losses that, in turn, stimulate rewards. Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue:
An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations,
72 Va. L. Rev. 879, 886-89 (1986). The stick that is used in Ybarra may generate an
activity-level effect, see infra Part II.C, but the compensation offered to the victim does not
create an incentive to create losses. It may, however, encourage those who have suffered
losses to claim that they were caused by a group of attractive defendants.
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for insurance. 3 1 We have seen that Ybarra-like liability has been
assigned to such defendants as manufacturers, common carriers,
and doctors, but this sort of refined group liability has virtually

never been applied to a small number of individuals-perhaps
because some of these individuals are likely to be without liability

insurance.

2

It may well be that passengers in an elevator do not

face Ybarra-like liability because we do not wish to force so much
risk on uninsured individuals. 3 In slight contrast, factories along a
polluted river may be subject to liability in the manner of Ybarra,

-and they can more easily insure against such liability. I return to
the importance of insurability in Section III.D.
It is tempting to enrich this explanation with a link to the distinction between negligence and intentional wrongdoing. One reaction
to the question of why Ybarra might be praised in the operating
room but not in the elevator is that where intentional wrongdoing
is concerned we are less inclined to invoke any form of group liability. 4 If insurance were truly unavailable for intentional wrongdoing and always permitted otherwise, either as a matter of public

policy or as a practical contractual means of controlling moral
31 The explanation that follows in the text might be reinterpreted as showing that in
certain areas of law individuals are freed from liability where businesses are not. This
distinction is discussed in Part III.A.
32 Homeowner's policies may well cover the kinds of group liability likely to threaten
individuals, see infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing possible liability for
negligent salad preparation and smoking in a hotel room), and even overextraction in an
elevator, but many individuals do not own homes (and thus do not carry homeowner's
insurance policies) and do not carry other means of liability insurance.
33 Somewhat similarly, much as individual students or faculty members might aspire to
create a law school "community," few would agree to share the losses associated with
stolen backpacks and the like.
34 One explanation for this reaction is that the greater stigma attached to responsibility
for an intentional wrong is (and should be) more cautiously placed on innocent shoulders.
Another explanation may be that where there is intentional wrongdoing there may be no
insurance, so that courts are especially disinclined to impose group liability. As for the first
of these reasons, I am inclined to think that if this liability were shared, the stigma would
largely disappear. More generally, it is not entirely clear that the distinction between
negligence and intentional wrongdoing is doctrinally correct. If Ybarra had involved a
wound carved into the patient's shoulder, so that the court were confident it had been
intentionally and maliciously inflicted, would it have declined to find group liability? To be
sure, it might not have used the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, because that doctrine does
seem (strangely) limited to cases involving negligence, see Prosser and Keeton, supra note
6, § 39, at 244; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D (1964), rather than intentional torts,
but there may have been other routes to the same outcome. Note that res ipsa itself may
be limited to cases where insurance is available to the defendant.
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hazards, then the connection would be a close one although a bit
arbitrary. But inasmuch as the line between intentional (or uninsurable) and other wrongdoing is itself blurry, there is not much to
be gained from emphasizing that the wrongdoing
in the elevator
35
was intentional whereas that in Ybarra was not.
II. OvRExTRAcrION
A. Designing Overextraction Rules
It goes almost without saying that overextraction must be limited
or designed to induce the rational wrongdoer to confess. 3 6 Overextraction would be somewhat wastefully chilling where an innocent
person could falsely confess and extremely so where the wrongdoer
was unaware of his own wrongdoing. A false confession allows an
innocent person to pay where the wrongdoer should have paid. In
contrast, where there is an unaware wrongdoer, all the innocents
will forfeit their overextracted payments. Indeed, Ybarra itself is
ill-suited for overextraction if the wrongdoer could have been unaware of his role in injuring the patient. The same might be true of
some polluters along a river; overextraction can be attractive only
if the nature of the pollution is such that we can be sure that the
polluter knows of its own misdeed, much as the pickpocket is
surely self-aware.
Careful design is also needed where the wrongdoer will fear that
confession brings on additional penalties. There is a tradeoff
between the cost of preserving the confessor's anonymity and the
cost of designing an overextraction scheme to make confession
attractive even to the wrongdoer who anticipates legal or extralegal
penalties beyond those imposed as part of the overextraction
rule. 37 Where anonymity is costly, and further penalties are antici35 The distinction between intentional and other wrongdoing, with respect to group
liability, is explored in Levmore, supra note 2.
36 I will use the term "confess" to include the anonymous return of what has been
stolen. I might say instead "right the wrong."
37 In the pickpocket example the problem of extralegal sanctions may not arise if the
passengers do not know one another. But if they do belong to a common community, and
a confessor must fear further punishment, the incentive not to confess can be eliminated by
maintaining the confessor's anonymity. The police officer might put each passenger in a
separate room and even allow each passenger to drop an envelope into a box. The
confessor would put the wallet in an envelope and preserve the secrecy of the "confession."
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pated by the potential confessing wrongdoer, the overextraction
scheme needs to tailor its penalties (downward) in order to make

confession attractive. One interesting implication of this requirement is that non-anonymous overextraction will be most difficult to
design precisely where "communal responsibility" is normally most
expected, namely where the target group members are closely
bound. For overextraction to work in these settings, where extrale-

gal sanctions are most likely, greater investments aimed at preserving anonymity will be worthwhile.
The cost of a failed application is of course greater the larger the
target group from which overextraction is demanded. Yet, it is
imperative that the target group contain the actual wrongdoer.3

In the elevator example, the target group can be narrowed by permitting passengers to choose between submitting to the overextrac-

tion scheme or to a search by the police officer.3 9 Other obvious
In other situations anonymity is less easily meshed with the need for a true confession.
In the case of factories along a river, for example, the confessing polluter will need to show
physical evidence at the factory site in order to demonstrate that it was really the wrongful
polluter and not simply a member of the target group eager to pay actual damages rather
than the larger overextraction amount. Anonymity is a convenient way to ease the fear
that confession will be followed by costly tort suits. Presumably, a third party (or
government agency) could be counted on as a confidence-maintaining stakeholder-and
indeed the government has every reason to limit penalties as promised by the
overextraction scheme in order to preserve the value of overextraction for the future.
Similarly, if something is stolen from a teacher's desk, the teacher can use overextraction in
ord6r to encourage the return of the stolen item (where only the thief will know what was
actually taken), and the teacher has every incentive to stick to the promised penalty in
order to make overextraction work and thereby reduce future wrongdoing.
38 There is likely to be some social loss arising out of every extraction from an innocent
party, and there are fewer such extractions the narrower the target group. Note that the
Ybarra approach also prefers a narrow target group and that both overextraction and
Ybarra must be sure that the wrongdoer is in the target group. In the actual Ybarra case,
the court was (correctly) forced to include among those subject to the joint liability rule a
nurse who was most unlikely to have witnessed much, but who might conceivably have
done the wrong herself. See Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 688.
39 A disadyantage of permitting anyone who is willing to be searched to skip the
overextraction rule is that the information-forcing component may be lost. A passenger
who has not stolen the wallet, and who agrees to be searched, may well know the identity
of the wrongdoer. On the other hand, Ybarra itself gives up the information-forcing idea
where a defendant is able to show that it could not have done the wrong in question.
Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 691 (stating that "all those defendants who ... might have caused theinjuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an
explanation of their conduct"). A more radical version of Ybarra might have permitted
defendants to escape liability only if all but one of them could show that they were not the
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problems can be avoided if the victim is permitted to trigger overextraction only by agreeing to be searched and to contribute along
with the other passengers in the overextraction scheme. The
search removes doubt as to whether the victim has relocated his
wallet. The payment might be understood either as a step toward
ensuring that the victim does not complain carelessly or as a step
toward encouraging the victim to internalize the cost imposed by
the extraction scheme on the innocent passengers. If there are five
other passengers, we might ask the victim to risk $600 or $750
rather than $150 (if the claim is that $100 was stolen) as a means of
fully internalizing the costs imposed on the innocent passengers.40
On the other hand, one reason the overextraction idea may fail is
that the thief sometimes bears personal hostility toward the victim.
The overextraction from the thief may succeed if the thief values
his own $150, for example, more than the victim's distress in losing
$100, but the same thief may be counterproductively encouraged
(either to steal or to decline to return what was stolen) by the prospect of the victim's losing $600 or more through an unsuccessful
overextraction scheme. Stealing in order to trigger the overextraction rule can be seen as a kind of vandalism, and there is apparently some taste to commit such a wrong even though it does not
enrich the perpetrator in the conventional sense. Moreover, if
large payments are required of victims, some victims will fail to
report wrongs of the very sort that might be solved and prevented
by overextraction.4 '

tortfeasor, but such a strong-form, information-forcing rule was apparently unpalatable to
the court in Ybarra.
The information-encouraging component of overextraction could be retained (even with
the search option) by a rule that offered anyone who had been searched a reward for
information. But see supra note 30 (considering the moral hazard associated with
rewards).
40 The large payment may also minimize the danger of threatening fellow passengers
that one will falsely report a theft. The problem of threats is taken up below in Part Ill.C.
41 Under existing legal rules, victims may under-report crimes because they consider the
costs of reporting but fail to consider the social gains either from catching someone who is
likely to commit future wrongs or from deterring criminals in general. On the other hand,
victims may over-report because they do not consider the costs borne by innocent targets
of any investigation (inasmuch as we lack perfect fee shifting in either criminal or civil
cases). Because overextraction requires payments from likely innocents-in addition to
the costs of being investigated-I pay special attention to the danger of over-reporting.
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Finally, although the overextraction idea remains a thought
experiment, it may be useful to point out that in the elevator example introduced at the-outset of this article, the wrongdoer is not
given much time in which to return what was stolen. Where evidence can be moved, time creates opportunity for shifting the
blame. Thus, if the announced rule were that the overextracted
funds would be returned if the wallet with the $100 were returned
within a week, then the clever wrongdoer might keep the stolen
cash but (anonymously) mail the wallet to the victim, or perhaps
even to another passenger. The innocent but rational recipient
might then add $100 to the wallet and return it to the stakeholder
in order to regain the $150 held by the stakeholder. One way to
guard against this failure, and its attendant social costs, is to
require the immediate return of the wallet (once the passengers
have been separated). Another is to offer each passenger the
opportunity to be searched rather than to pay the overextraction
amount-and then to keep secret the identity and number of passengers who refused to be searched. The rational wrongdoer
would, in turn, be more likely to return what he has taken because
he does not know to whom to mail the empty wallet. More generally, it is necessary to guard carefully against false confessions
because all members of the target group will gain if the confession
is accepted.4'
B. The OverextractionPuzzle
The most obvious objection to the oierextraction idea is that
failure generates additional innocent victims. An argument for
overextractive liability rather than no liability at all (in the absence
of firm evidence) is unlikely to succeed unless some experimentation suggests that in identifiable circumstances the threat of overextraction very often elicits a convincing confession. The puzzle of
overextraction is not, therefore, why we do not find overextraction
rather than no liability at all, but rather why there is Ybarra-like
liability and yet no overextraction. Liability of the kind found in
Ybarra and products liability law does, after all, also threaten inno42 And, more generally, delay offers an opportunity to frame or to encourage (false)
confession by an innocent person. More modest group liability and individual liability also
encourage such behavior, but there is no reason to leave room for such destructive
behavior here. Other threat and side-bribe problems are taken up in Part III.C.
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cent defendants. In the absence of modest group liability, the
apparent distaste for overextraction would not be puzzling.43
Overextraction offers some advantages that Ybarra cannot
match. The first and most interesting of these is the incentive provided for the rational thief to confess. 44 Both moderate group liability and overextraction encourage witnesses to come forward
with information about a wrongdoer, but only a carefully designed
overextraction scheme also encourages the rational wrongdoer to

confess.
The second advantage of overextraction over more moderate
group liability is that the latter but not the former provides an

incentive to make false claims. Group, or joint, liability as in
Ybarra encourages false claims because the claimant gains
"compensation." In contrast, a cautiously designed overextraction scheme offers no gain (and indeed a substantial
loss) to the dishonest "victim," 45 at the same time that it
offers a concrete, immediate reward 46 to the confessing wrong43 The familiar preference for letting nine guilty people go free rather than punishing
one innocent person reflects the view that it is morally reprehensible for the state to punish
the innocent even if passivity on the state's part can lead to other detrimental
consequences. The overextraction idea also risks punishing the innocent, because
wrongdoers will not always behave rationally. On the other hand, a hidden social benefit
of both overextraction and Ybarra-like liability is that investigation costs can be saved.
44 Inasmuch as I have suggested that vicarious liability and products liability can often
be thought of as a kind of information-forcing group liability, there is the provocative
question whether the overextraction idea could be useful in these fairly general contexts.
If a car or aircraft explodes during normal use, instead of holding the manufacturer liable
(even though the true wrongdoer may be the maker of a component) we might overextract
from the manufacturer and every subcontractor unless one of these defendants could
convincingly demonstrate that its wrongdoing caused the loss (in which case it would pay
for the loss). The problem, of course, is that the negligent manufacturer of a component
may not know that it wrongfully caused the loss in question. In the elevator example it is,
therefore, not simply the presence of uncertainty (on the law's part) that makes
overextraction intriguing but also the lack of uncertainty on the part of the actual
wrongdoer. Vicarious liability and products liability law thus offer examples of the regular
imposition of liability on innocents, but they do not offer broad fields of application for the
overextraction idea.
45 The possibility of false claims arising out of threats or side deals is taken up in Part
III.C.
46 Criminal punishment is sometimes thought to be ineffective because many
wrongdoers have short time horizons, so that they excessively discount both the probability
of punishment and the burden of its administration far in the future. An interesting
attribute of overextraction is that it offers (non-judgment-proof) criminals an immediate
reward for confessions.
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doer. 47 Overextraction, it should be noted, also offers a stronger
incentive for witnesses to come forward and ,for potential target
group members to be vigilant in a way that might produce the
information that will help them escape overextractive liability.
Indeed, one way to think of overextraction is as a system that piles
on incentives without generating moral hazards. But to the extent
that these strong incentives also create problems, and contribute to
the social costs of failure, I will not count this stronger incentive as
an unambiguous advantage of overextraction over more modest
joint liability.4s
C. The Chilling Effect of Overextraction
I have compared (and presented the puzzle of) the absence of
overextraction and the presence of Ybarra-like liability, with an
emphasis on the relative advantages that overextraction might
enjoy. At the same time, Ybarra and overextraction share some
disadvantages. It is likely, however, that the common disadvantages are more serious for overextraction because the amount
extracted from innocents (when the wrongdoer does not confess) is
larger than it is under comparable Ybarra-style rules. Thus, both
Ybarra-like and overextractive liability might discourage people
from boarding elevators, but such an activity-level, or chilling,
effect might be greater when the threat is of the larger, overextractive kind.
This comparison between overextraction and more modest
group liability suggests that overextraction might be most successful where modest group liability is already found if only because
the latter is likely to be used where the chilling effect is limited.
We have seen that there are occasional examples of group liability
47 Overextraction can also be compared to the broader (noncompensatory) variety of de
facto group liability. Through taxes, price increases, and other means, products liability
and other de facto group liability also extracts from the innocent, generates potentially
serious activity-level inefficiencies, and may be problematic where judgment-proof players
are concerned (because these citizens will have no incentive to report on wrongdoers, for
example, if their own tax liabilities are not increased at all). On the other side of the
ledger, neither overextraction nor broad group liability encourages false reports by
"victims," but only overextraction offers concrete incentives for wrongdoers to confess.
48 Thus, one would hardly prefer for the overextraction rule to demand $10,000 from
each passenger, rather than $150, in order to strengthen the incentives to prbduce
information.
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in the face of uncertainty in the operating room and on the loading
dock, 4 9 but such rules are much more familiar in the context of
classroom, prison and military discipline. A teacher or officer
might respond to wrongdoing by an unknown actor by imposing a
communal curfew, for example, or otherwise withholding a benefit
expected by all. The penalty may be intended to encourage peer
pressure (in the future and even in the present if the penalty will be
withdrawn in the event of a convincing confession by the wrongdoer) or the production of information. The remedy does not rise
to the level of overextraction. If, for instance, a wrong has been
committed in the barracks, we might expect a sergeant to announce
that all weekend leaves are canceled, but we do not expect this to
be accompanied by a promise that if the thief steps forward (everyone else will be free to go but) the thief will receive the lesser punishment of leave for only half the weekend. The group penalty
may encourage witnesses, build group solidarity (or not), and even
put peer pressure or guilt feelings on the culprit, but the rational,
selfish wrongdoer may still keep silent. Indeed, the punishment
experienced by the confessing wrongdoer may well be greater if
the confession follows the threat of group punishment than if it
precedes it.
One obvious characteristic common to prisons, armies, and classrooms is that the participants cannot easily exit from their peer
groups. This fits with an obvious explanation of why we rarely find
much group liability, of either the Ybarra or overextractive kind, in
the face of uncertainty about the wrongdoer's identity: there may
be activity-level effects' encouraging people to steer clear of groups
or locations where such liability might be imposed. We may find
neither overextraction nor group liability in the case of pickpocketing on an elevator, because even modest group liability would
severely curtail our sharing of elevators with strangers.
I think it is easy to overemphasize the importance of this activity-level explanation for the disinclination to use or even tolerate
an overextraction rule. First, the argument assumes that the rule
will rarely work. It is possible, after all, that the rule will work well
enough to discourage pickpocketing so that people who previously
avoided crowds because of the fear of pickpocketing will now be
49

See supra Part I.A.

HeinOnline -- 81 Va. L. Rev. 1581 1995

1582

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 81:1561

more likely to share elevators. Second, even where possible activity-level effects are likely to be small, we find little group liability.
In short, the activity-level effect of group liability probably explains
where and when we ought to find experimentation with such liability, even in its overextractive version, but it fails to explain the
complete absence of overextractive rules and the occasional presence of liability along the lines of Ybarra.50 In a world where one
must fear assaults and other wrongs when sharing elevators with
strangers, it seems unlikely that the incremental chilling danger
posed by an overextraction rule would make much difference in
our inclination to share a ride.
D. Judgment-ProofSuspects
A more practical explanation for the absence of experimentation
with immoderate group liability focuses on the overextraction
requirement itself. If the stolen wallet contained not $100 but
rather $3000, some passengers would likely have insufficient wealth
to provide more than that amount. I set the original portrayal in
an office building, and with $100 missing, in order to illustrate the
overextraction rule where such a serious judgment-proof obstacle
was unlikely. But the problem suggests that we might be most
likely to find group liability, even of the limited Ybarra kind, aimed
at business enterprises rather than individuals, or applied where
the penalty can be assessed in nonmonetary fashion.
If we are uncertain which of four factories has polluted a waterway, we might imagine shared liability of one kind or another sub50 Moreover, there are other rules in tort and criminal law that can be described as
information-forcing. Thus, criminal laws aimed at accomplices and conspirators can be
described in this manner. Similarly, the criminal law doctrine of "constructive possession"
can be understood as applying where one who is in control of a location is bound to have
information about the commission of a crime in that location. In People v. Valot, 189
N.W.2d 873 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971), for example, the defendant had rented a motel room in
which he was found along with four other persons; the discovered evidence suggested that
at least one person had used and possessed a controlled substance in the room. The
defendant was held in "control" of that room and therefore criminally responsible in the
absence of any testimony from the five hotel room occupants. The best way to distinguish
this case from one in which a homeowner or entrepreneur is charged on the basis of
.evidence that illegal drugs were used on the defendant's premises is to stress that in Valot,
but not in many less intimate situations, the court can be certain that the defendant had
information about the introduction of the drugs to the premises.
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ject to a defendant's ability to prove that it was not the polluter.5 1
This is not, it should be noted, closely related to market share liability as applied to pharmaceutical companies 52 or as found in the
famous case of Summers v. Tice 53 -where one of two hunters shot
the pellet that claimed plaintiff's eye-because in those cases all
defendants behaved negligently and the uncertainty is limited to

causation. In those settings liability can sometimes be applied in a
way that will either seem quite fair and efficient across many cases
or that
will at least make no greater error than a rule of no liability.54 In contrast, the health professionals in Ybarra, the passen51 It is easy to imagine situations where defendants will have trouble developing
information that another defendant was the real wrongdoer. And there will be many
situations where any given blameless defendant will have difficulty proving its innocence.
At the same time, it may be fairly easy for the wrongdoer to confess convincingly. We may
not know when and where to look for evidence of pollution, for example, but the polluter
may be able to show us exactly how it accomplished the Wrongful pollution. In this
situation an overextractive rule has promise. An Ybarra-style rule may be inferior because
the gains from polluting may exceed the fractional share of the damages imposed on each
player. A successful overextractive rule must threaten all members of the narrow target
group with substantial liability so that the wrongdoer will find it worthwhile to confess and
subsequently to bear both the costs of whatever (smaller) penalty is assessed and the costs
associated with its inability to continue future undetected pollution.
A successful overextraction scheme also requires that the wrongdoer know of its own
wrongdoing and that non-wrongdoers be unable to "confess."
52 Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
53 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
54 In the case of market share liability, where all defendants are negligent and all have
caused some injuries, the problem is simply one of matching defendants with the victims
they have injured. From a deterrence (and even a fairness) point of view, no harm is done
with group liability because on average all will pay as they would in a world with no
uncertainty. Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs,
19 J. Legal Stud. 691, 697-98 (1990). Summers is a different problem because it is not one
where averaging across many victims is possible. But there is at least the argument that the
"error costs" of making the wrong defendant pay can be expected to be the same as the
error costs associated with absolving the defendants of liability. With no liability the real
wrongdoer is underdeterred by $X, where X is the victim's uncompensated loss. With joint
liability of $.5X on each hunter in Summers, the responsible wrongdoer underpays $.5X
and the unlucky (but negligent) codefendant overpays $.5X, so that the total error,
measured in this way, is again $X. Levmore, supra, at 693-94.
As a philosophical and logical matter one might argue that group liability is no more
remarkable when it is applied to completely innocent actors than to wrongdoers who may
not have caused the injury in question. This is apparently the unstated premise of Bush,
supra note 21, But from an error-minimizing or acceptability perspective the important
difference between group liability in a case like Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.
1980), and that found in Ybarra or the elevator, is that mistakes are likely to average out
only where the defendants are repeat players. Negligence on the part of all defendants
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gers on the elevator, and the factories located on a polluted
waterway are likely to include a majority of non-negligent actors. 55
In any event, if the factory owners are attractive defendants for

group and even overextractive liability, it is in part because they
are imagined as well-financed rather than as judgment proof.
Turning to nonmonetary extractions, the obstacle presented by

judgment-proof individuals can be avoided by offering an alternative to cash payment. Elevator passengers could be told that they
must either submit to a moderately intrusive personal search or

pay an amount greater than that in the stolen wallet.56 Inasmuch

as the overextraction rule is improved with a smaller target
group-so long as this target group is certain to include the thief"volunteers" to be searched are welcome as a means of narrowing
the group from which to extract. In the extreme case, if all but one
passenger agree to be searched, the police will surely have probable cause to search the remaining passenger, who in the stylized
hypothetical will be identified as the thief.
In other settings, where searches may be less successful tools of
investigation, the nonmonetary good to be extracted is of the more
obvious and general kind. Each passenger could be threatened

with some amount of incarceration or some hours of community
might be taken as a proxy for situations in which repeat play, or recurring involvement, is
likely.
55 There is something of a design problem if more than one factory may be a wrongful
polluter. Each confessor would need to show how much it contributed to the pollution
problem, and overextracted payments should be returned only when the aggregate amount
to which the parties convincingly confessed equals the amount thought to have been
wrongfully discharged.
56 There may be some objections to such a search-or-pay scheme on constitutional or
other grounds, but for the sake of argument I will assume that we would permit such a
"tax" on the right not to be searched. There is no doubt the law can impose Ybarra-llke
liability, on the blameless and blameworthy alike, and I would think there little doubt but
that one could escape such liability by showing that one is blameless-even if the manner
of proof involves agreeing to a search that could not otherwise be required. The question
may be more complicated if wealth turns out to be a good predictor of who chooses to be
searched and who pays "taxes." More generally, overextraction schemes can be designed
as taxes, but if these taxes are often imposed on those who cannot be expected to have the
means to pay them, and if a loss of liberty is the penalty for the nonpayment of taxes, there
will be serious constitutional objections. But inasmuch as I am not suggesting that we
enact such an overextractive scheme, and there is not something plainly lawless or
unconstitutional about a narrowly designed overextraction rule, I will not dwell further on
the relationship to the law of search-and-seizure, unconstitutional conditions, due process
or extortion.

HeinOnline -- 81 Va. L. Rev. 1584 1995

1995]

Gomorrah to Ybarra and More

1585

service. Anonymity for the "confessing" wrongdoer is now not as
easy to offer; there would simply need to be a credible promise that
if the wrongdoer returned the wallet, the innocent passengers
would owe no time, and the wrongdoer would serve something less
than the amount earlier threatened. The law would have every
incentive to make good on this promise, and the wrongdoer could
rely on it, knowing that a breach of this promise would ruin the
overextraction rule in'the future. 57 Theoretically, the threats can
be alternatives offered to all target group members so that each
passenger might choose among incarceration, community service,
and a monetary payment. The important thing is to insure that
every alternative threat overextracts from the thief. If the thief
prefers a month in jail to returning $3000, then a month is an insufficient threat-and the consequences are rather serious for all the
innocent passengers.
I think it safe to say that while we might expect such threats (of
either the Ybarra or the overextractive type) from occupying
armies or prison wardens, who might not value the individual and
social loss associated with incarcerating or otherwise penalizing
innocent people, it is most unlikely that such threats would be used
in the normal course of governing, and not unlikely that such
threats would be constitutionally impermissible even if democratically desired.5 8 A cynical observer might say that our prosecutors
often use such threats, perhaps in the form of criminal conspiracy
charges, but so long as they are aimed not at people "like us" in an
elevator but instead at a social or a criminal class remote from our
experiences, few objections are heard. Put differently, the very
idea of incarceration for untimely elevator travel (and for a subsequent unwillingness to be searched) would be shocking and
57 More generally, the overextraction idea unravels if the wrongdoer's confession is
inhibited by the prospect of implicit penalties. In the elevator illustration, anonymity
guarded against this problem, but in other situations there would need to be a credible
promise to the confessor. Superficially, this may seem difficult to accomplish because even
if the stakeholder keeps the wrongdoer's identity confidential, there would seem to be
reputational losses to all members of the group (one of whom is a known wrongdoer). But
this ignores the fact that knowledge of the original loss or wrongdoing already threatens
the reputation of all members of the group. Moreover, the institution of an overextraction
scheme would over time reduce the stigma associated with this kind of collectively imposed
liability.
58 The complication is that the scheme can be described as a tax, with incarceration and
the like only required of those who do not pay their taxes.
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unpalatable to most citizens. Hence the overextraction idea must
either deal with the judgment-proof problem in a different manner
(or be used to emphasize that similar threats seem less shocking to
most citizens when applied in a different arena).
Returning to the problem of designing an overextraction scheme
when a substantial property crime is at issue and the wrongdoer
may be judgment-proof (for a judgment or threat in the range of
the property at risk), the size of the nonmonetary substitute threat
that would be necessary to effect the overextraction idea is likely to
threaten too great a social loss. This point may be clearer in
(unpopular) economic terms. Monetary transfers from the innocent members of the target group to charities or to government
programs, as would occur when the overextraction rule fails, yield
social losses much less than the private losses experienced by these
individuals.5 9 But if monetary transfers cannot be used because
targeted wrongdoers may be judgment proof, then available substitute threats (such as incarceration) will nearly always be accompanied by relatively large social losses. This suggests that the
overextraction idea is probably best (but still shockingly) thought
of as applied with alternative threats. When $100 is stolen we
might demand $150 from every passenger, but when $3000 is stolen
the system might need to require each passenger to choose
whether to pay $3500, serve six months in prison, or work 1000
hours at a job offered by the state. Again, all these debts would be
forgiven if (or when) the wrongdoer returns the missing wallet and
money, and none of these alternatives need be chosen by a passenger who consents to a search. In short, the judgment-proof problem creates the need to extract penalties in forms that yield greater
social costs, but by offering choices (including monetary payments)
these costs may be controlled. Still, these costs are a good proxy
59 The idea is that the cost to the innocent loser is at least somewhat offset by the gain
derived from the use to which the funds are put. In the case of theft itself, it is therefore
sometimes said that the social loss comes not from the involuntary wealth transfer (an
assessment of which requires interpersonal utility comparisons) but rather pertains to the
costs of precautions taken against theft and the importance of secure property rights in
encouraging socially valuable work effort. Still, it is noteworthy that the most salient costs
associated with an unsuccessful overextraction scheme are private costs that are likely to
exceed social costs. Moreover, the social gains from successful overextraction, in the form
of deterrence and reduced investigation costs, do not fall on identifiable winners who can
therefore be expected to lobby in favor of such schemes.
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for the political unacceptability of most applications of the overextraction (and even the Ybarra) idea.
E. Private Bargainingfor Overextraction
It is not terribly puzzling, I think, that we find no private bargains for overextraction. In the elevator case, for example, there is
no reason for an innocent passenger to think that by agreeing to be
searched (or to pay $150 in an overextraction scheme) other citizens will agree to do the same in the future. It is possible that upon
entering the elevator most would agree to participate in an overextraction scheme, and especially to a scheme in which one could
avoid monetary liability by agreeing to be searched in the event of
a crime, but once the crime is already committed, and the victim is
a stranger, there is much less to be gained from voluntary participation. This is precisely the situation where legal rules are most
often needed as precommitment devices. And through the
purchase of insurance contracts people do consent, in a manner of
speaking, to sharing agreements before entering elevators. Overextraction, however, is not generally a part of these contracts. I
return to the relevance of insurance practices below in Part III,
with a more general discussion of the puzzle of (the absence of)
overextraction rules.
But the puzzling comparison of overextraction and more modest,
Ybarra-like, group liability (where the puzzle is that the latter is
familiar while the former is unknown) suggests that where modest
group liability is threatened, a majority of such a target group
might lobby or vote 60 for the alternative of an overextractive
scheme in order to avoid group liability for the actions of a wrongdoer in their midst. Most people would surely object to paying any
amount after a fellow passenger was pickpocketed. But if offered a
choice between paying twenty dollars, as called for by the Ybarra
rule, or $150 (with a much greater likelihood of the money being
refunded), as is consistent with the overextraction rule, the latter
may at least sometimes be preferable.61 Again, the overextraction
6o Bargaining alone would do no good, because the wrongdoer might hold out.

61 To the extent that witnesses do not come forward because they fear retaliation, it is
possible that $150, rather than $20 or nothing, will help overcome this disinclination. Thus,

although passengers might privately prefer less liability rather than more, there may be a
social reason for preferring overextraction. The discussion in the text, however, focuses
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puzzle is why we do not find overextraction in legal systems that
have already decided to -impose Ybarra-like liability.
I can barely imagine firms along a river, subjected to Superfund
liability or other group liability, lobbying for an overextraction
scheme. More interesting, perhaps, is the converse possibility that
if overextraction were used in this situation, the target group could
bargain out of the overextraction scheme. Thus, if overextraction
were tried but found too costly, perhaps because the target group
alone recognized that false confessions can be made to look convincing, there would be the convenient escape hatch of a private
agreement to clean up the river or compensate plaintiffs (or even
contribute to political insiders) in order to avoid overextraction. 62
Finally, there is the possibility that private bargaining will lead to
overextraction because victims might pay other parties to participate in such a scheme. The victim in the elevator might offer a
nonrefundable ten dollars to each passenger as encouragement or
compensation for undertaking the risk of contribution or agreeing
to be searched. But inasmuch as private bargaining cannot, presumably, coerce unwilling participants, the only point of such a
payment by the victim is that the victim must hope that the thief
will fear participation (most simply in the form of consent to be
searched) sufficient to generate probable cause for searching the
thief. The rational thief therefore might agree to participate in an
overextraction scheme only if everyone else does so as well.63 One
problem with this kind of private bargaining is that it might subsidize and thus encourage thievery. The victim may be initiating or
preempting a kind of extortion scheme that is socially undesirable
even if privately worthwhile. A thief might simply steal with the.
not on the argument for overextraction but rather on the possibility that when faced with
modest group liability, target group members will prefer overextraction.
62 Such bargaining might also take place in the shadow of overextraction. An industry
might agree to clean a river or pay claimants in order to forestall a legislative move to
overextraction.
63 If the victim's payments encourage consents to searches, rather than participation in
an overextraction scheme, then there is the general question why victims do not try this
approach. Inasmuch as my focus is on group liability, I assume that some innocent
passengers might prefer overextraction to search.
Note that the thief will probably not be alone in agreeing to participate only if others
agree as well. An interesting question is what the thief will do if the passengers are
separated before this $10 offer is made.
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intention of anonymously returning what has been taken after
receiving the ten dollar subsidy. If this danger is combatted with a
rule of refundability, so that the ten dollars is retained only in the
event that the thief does not return the wallet (so that the rational
thief will return both the wallet and the ten dollars in order to
reclaim his $150), the scheme is nothing more than an overextraction rule with a forty dollar (rather than fifty dollar) margin of
safety. This margin needs to be large enough to overcome the fact
that the wallet itself (and its other contents) may be of some value,
the likelihood that the wrongdoer takes pleasure in the victim's distress, and small evidentiary doubts. These doubts can arise out of
perfectly guileless behavior; the victim might conservatively say the
wallet has $100 in it when in fact it has $140. 64
F. Collusion and Plea Bargaining
I have stressed that the critical aspect of overextraction is its
influence on the rational wrongdoer, but at the same time I have
hinted that there is something circular about this argument. If
overextraction is a clever tool in the fight against wrongdoing, then
the truly rational wrongdoer may not return wallets or otherwise
confess, precisely in order to disabuse the rest of us of the idea that
we have a useful tool. Inasmuch as unsuccessful overextraction
imposes substantial social and private costs, wrongdoers will need
to resist but occasionally the short-run temptation to confess in
order to ruin any possible case for the overextraction rule.
But, again, it is easy to make too much of this argument against
overextraction. The response of any individual wrongdoer will
contribute so'little to the overall success of an overextraction rule
that it is surely fair to describe the rational pickpocket, for
instance, as inclined to return the wallet when faced with the terms
of the overextraction rule. This is what we normally mean by
rationality. It is of course true that wrongdoers in general might
wish to collude in order to ensure the failure of an overextraction
scheme. But such collusion is nearly impossible not only to the
64 We can imagine imposing a penalty for misstating the value of what has been taken,
but this step is probably made unnecessary by the requirement that the victim participate
in the overextraction scheme. This internalization requirement addresses the case of
overstatement as well as understatement by the victim.
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extent that there is "no honor among thieves," but also because the
"rational" thief will simply defect from a collusive agreement.
The evolutionary success of plea bargaining offers a doubly apt
analogy. Cooperating criminals might agree (or might signal to
one another by acting as if they had agreed) to refuse prosecutors'
settlement offers and to demand jury trials in order to force the
state to expend greater resources in trials. These expenditures
would almost surely make it impossible for the state to proceed
against as many defendants as in a world with a great deal of plea
bargaining unless trials became more "casual" or less adversarial.65
The criminal enforcement and justice system might not collapse if
all plea bargains were refused by defendants, but it is likely that in
the short-run criminal defendants would be better off if a very large
number of them refused settlement offers and insisted on jury trials. But the fact that most criminals might wish they could collude
in refusing plea bargains does not mean that it is rational for one
criminal defendant to refuse to plea (or even to insist on a jury
trial). And we do not dismiss the idea of plea bargaining simply
because criminals wish they could cooperate in order to create
institutional difficulties.
Plea bargaining is an especially good example here because in
one respect plea bargaining itself is an example of the overextractive ideal. A prosecutor may induce a guilty plea with the threat of
extensive investigation, multiple charges, and greater penalties in
the event that the defendant opts for, and loses at, a trial. Similarly, an overextractive rule threatens the wrongdoer with a greater
penalty in the event that there is no confession and with a lesser
penalty in the event of confession. Both schemes seek to
encourage rational confessions and both seek to guard against false

65 See Robert E. Scott & William J, Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J.
1909, 1916 (1992) (assuming tradeoff between alienable right to an elaborate trial and
inalienable right to a more casual trial process and arguing that most defendants would
prefer former); John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do
It, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 204 (1979) (describing advantages of nonadversarial system with guilty
pleas). The collusive strategy would need to include the demand for jury trials because
there is good evidence that trials without a jury could be relatively short and yet anything
but casual and nonadversarial. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?,
97 Harv. L. Rev. 1037 (1984) (describing a bench trial system used in Philadelphia).

HeinOnline -- 81 Va. L. Rev. 1590 1995

1995]

Gomorrah to Ybarra and More

1591

confessions. 66 And in some sense both overextraction and plea
bargaining attempt to reduce enforcement costs because, at least
theoretically, all uncertainty could be eliminated with greater information-gathering effort. Nevertheless, plea bargaining is not quite
an illustration of an overextraction rule. First, the central feature
of the overextraction idea is that it is always rational for the wrongdoer to confess. The same cannot be said for the criminal (or tort)
defendant offered a settlement. Moreover, plea bargaining is not a
subset of overextraction because the former process does not generally seek to force out the identity of the wrongdoer. It is difficult
to argue that plea bargaining is a method of identifying a wrongdoer within a group of otherwise innocents, but it is plausible that
an overextraction scheme could induce a pickpocket to return stolen money.
This comparison between plea bargaining and overextraction
highlights the puzzling absence of the latter alongside the popularity of the former. One way to think of the overextraction idea is as
a mixture of two familiar and accepted strategies, information-forcing group liability and plea bargaining. The evolutignary survival
of these strategies shows that at least some legal systems are prepared to threaten innocents, bargain with wrongdoers, and exploit
the state's resources as leverage to gain confessions. Overextraction may67 be offensive, but it does not seem to be so for novel
reasons.
66 This is not the place to review the literature on plea bargaining, but every reader of
law reviews knows that there is serious doubt as to the "rationality" of some plea
bargaining and even more doubt as to the system's ability (or incentive) to block guilty
pleas by risk-averse innocent defendants. See, e.g, Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing
Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 652, 716 (1981); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal
Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. Legal Stud. 43, 74 (1988). In principle, our
legal system requires that there be a factual basis for a guilty plea, see, e.g., Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(f), and at least theoretically a judge (or an ethical prosecutor) could require sufficient
detail to increase the likelihood that such pleas are only bargained for and entered into by
the truly guilty. In the face of such a serious rule, there will remain a residual problem of
collusion between the prosecution and the defense, much as the overextraction idea will
always suffer from the problem of under-reporting or false "confessions" by victims. See
infra Part III.C.
67 A critical difference between plea bargaining and overextraction may be that only the
latter intentionally strikes at the innocent. Plea bargaining is found quite distasteful when
prosecutorial threats induce innocent people to "confess" rather than to proceed with
lengthy investigations and trials and their attendant costs. On the other hand, inasmuch as
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THE ABSENCE OF OvRERXTRAcriON

I have suggested that, because the disadvantages of overextraction differ from those of more modest group liability only in
degree, there is something of a puzzle about the presence of the
latter but not the former. Both the Ybarra and overextractive versions of group liability offend our wish to protect rather than
penalize the innocent; both run into problems where judgmentproof defendants are concerned; and both risk generating activitylevel inefficiencies. The overextraction rule does more of each of
these three things, but at least in principle the functional, moral,
and jurisprudential arguments against overextraction and against
expanding Ybarra are comparable. To the extent that the legal system is prepared to deal with its inability to identify a wrongdoer by
targeting a group of persons that includes the wrongdoer as well as
innocents-perhaps because some of these innocent people have
information about the identity of the wrongdoer-it may be better
to take the more immoderate step of overextraction than either the
more obvious step of mere group liability or the more familiar step
of de facto broad group liability. 68 The puzzle that I attempt to

clarify in this Part concerns the absence of overextraction in a
world where group liability is common.
A.

Hidden Costs

One obvious problem with the political or judicial adoption of an
overextraction rule is that the immediate costs of unsuccessful
overextraction are painful to -contemplate. In contrast, if overextraction is successful, some of its benefits are hidden because they
involve the decline of activities such as pickpocketing.69 Similarly,
the popularity of broad but modest group liability can be ascribed
to the dispersed and often hidden costs of such burdens. Much as
the enactment of a government spending program is often
Ybarra-like liability also knowingly takes aim at the innocent (along with the
blameworthy), there must be something more to the objection to overextraction.
68 These broad (tax and regulatory) schemes differ, once again, from Ybarra and the
elevator case in that they generally provide no immediate compensation to the claimant.
69 Instances of unsuccessful application of the overextraction rule are also likely to be
more salient than occasions when the rule works and all innocent players enjoy full
refunds. Note that some of the benefits of overextraction, such as reduced investigation
costs, are also available with more modest group liability.
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explained as the product of encouragement by coordinated beneficiaries (who face little opposition from relatively dispersed taxpayers who pay for the program), we can explain many loss-sharing
arrangements'as satisfying relatively organized interests at the
expense of less identifiable, dispersed losers. The puzzling absence
of overextraction in a world where there are other group liability
schemes can in this way be solved with the observation that the.
relative advantages of overextraction go unnoticed, while the costs
tend to attract attention.7 °
A slightly different and more cynical version of the hidden costs
explanation is that most people (including legislators and judges)
abhor forcing contributions from innocents only when they can
identify with these innocent losers. When the defendants are businesses, for example, the reaction to group liability is less negative
than where individual defendants are concerned (perhaps because
the effect of such liability on prices is hidden or not fully understood). It is no accident, I think, that outside of the medical context the cases which most resemble (or even expand upon) Ybarra
involve defendants that are common carriers, warehouse owners,
70 A related argument is that legal systems do well to avoid large, salient costs by
favoring rules that are relatively tolerant of factfinding (and other) errors. The burden of
proof that must be met to justify criminal penalties and the evolution toward comparative
negligence are two examples of developments that can be understood in this manner. In
the criminal law example, the law is apparently and understandably concerned about
levying a criminal penalty on an innocent person whereas the comparable civil case
involves mere error minimization across -like plaintiffs and defendants. Somewhat
similarly, comparative negligence can lead to error in the assignment of responsibility, but
a rule incorporating contributory negligence as a complete defense (or not) is almost by
definition more likely to turn a small error in factfinding into a large monetary error or
other injustice. In any event these examples may suggest that overextraction is not used
because it threatens to make large errors if, for example, the overextracted amount is
(even) slightly too small or the value of anonymity is underestimated.
I must leave for another day the question of when and why legal systems are "error
sensitive" in the manner suggested. For the present, however, it is important to see that
overextraction need not always be error sensitive. There is, for example, not a single
correct amount to overextract in the pickpocketing case, but rather a range over which
there will be enough at stake to elicit a rational confession but not so much as to create
unnecessary judgment-proof problems. But the larger point is that law often does favor
rules that are more error-sensitive than alternatives. Thus, we use a preponderance-of-theevidence rule with the effect of a tipping point, so that if a factfinder finds the defendant
51% likely to have done something then this defendant might pay 100% of plaintiff's
damages. A more probabilistic rule might have had this defendant pay 51% of plaintiff's
damages. The probabilistic rule would not be error-minimizing, but it would obviously
guard more carefully against large errors. See Levmore, supra note 54, at 703-04.
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manufacturers, and other business enterprises. And to the extent

that the most important examples of group liability are accomplished through vicarious liability or products liability law, as suggested earlier,71 judgments normally fall on business enterprises
rather than (uninsured) individuals. Ybarra itself involved a hospi-

tal, doctors, and other health professionals who are normally
insured. In contrast, the decisions most striking in their refusal- to

follow or to expand upon Ybarra involve preparers of turkey

salad,72 smokers in a hotel room that later catches fire,73 and jeer-

ing onlookers who might know the identity of the person who
assaulted a misbehaving police officer 74-cases

where the defend-

ants are nonbusiness individuals. 75
In short, a simple-if overtly political-explanation for the

absence of group, information-forcing, and even non-overextractive liability in the elevator case may be that there is virtually no
precedent for such liability where mere individuals are concerned.
On the other hand, inasmuch as we do not find overextractive
schemes aimed at corporate defendants, where such schemes might
in fact work best, the argument about hidden costs falls short of
explaining the puzzles associated with the overextraction idea.

71
72

See supra Part I.B.
Samson v. Riesing, 215 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 1974).

73 Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Knobbe, 562 P.2d 825 (Nev. 1977) (declining to
impose liability for fire damage where four smokers had been in the hotel room where fire
began but where many hotel employees also had keys to the room).
74 Clift v. Nelson, 608 P.2d 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (refusing to find liability where
many onlookers jeered at misbehaving police officer and some may well have known
identity of wrongdoer who assaulted officer).
75 The correlation between insurance coverage (more likely carried by businesses than
individuals) and liability is considered in Part III.D.
Note that businesses are repeat players and therefore more likely to collude over time
(in order to create uncertainty and thus avoid liability while reducing precaution costs).
Another possible explanation for the disinclination to use group liability where individuals
are concerned is that there are natural, self-serving reasons to take precautions in many of
the nonbusiness cases. Thus, a parent might be expected to take care in food preparation
(even knowing that wrongdoing would be impossible to trace), because the preparer's own
child will partake in the jointly prepared food. But neither of these distinctions seems to
explain more than a modest subset of the cases, and the latter suffers from the problem
that liability for defective products is hardly reduced where a manufacturer's executives
use the product in their consumer lives.
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Proportionality

The law and economics literature offers many examples where
optimal deterrence can be preserved or even best accomplished
with large penalties, only occasionally applied. Criminal law, tort
law, and popular reaction do not, however, appear to be entirely
sympathetic to such a probabilistic view of justice. 76 Instead, there
is an important element of proportionality in much of law, so that
greater wrongs are expected to yield more severe penalties. The
overextraction idea is at odds with this norm because it requires
larger extractions for smaller wrongs in order to make room for
offers that wrongdoers will not decline. It will often be the case
that greater penalties need to be attached to suspicions than to
known wrongdoings, and this will violate the proportionality norm.
Thus, the overextractive threat against four factories on a polluted
waterway may far exceed the direct liability that would be applied
if there were no uncertainty and a single factory were found to be
wrongfully polluting the waterway to the same degree.
The proportionality theme is clearer when used to explore the
overextraction rule's assumptions about the "rational" wrongdoer.
If wrongdoers always behaved rationally, then an overextraction
scheme could solve virtually every crime. An armed robbery of a
convenience store might be followed by an announcement that all
persons fitting the general description of the robber and living
within a certain number of miles of the store will serve thirty years
in prison unless the wrongdoer convincingly confesses and in
return receives a "reduced" prison term of twenty years as befitting
the crime. If wrongdoers behave rationally, there will never be an
overextraction. One problem, of course, is that the rational wrongdoer will correctly surmise that our society will not tolerate this
overextraction from the innocent. Even if the costs of crime (to
the innocent) were demonstrably greater than those associated
with this brutal overextraction, nevertheless the calculated, large76 Thus, punitive damages might be expected where the wrongdoer could easily have
escaped detection, but in fact punitive damages are most likely where the wrongdoer is
brazen. See Malcom E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive
Damages Procedures, 69 Va. L. Rev. 269, 282 (1983) (noting that "the jury must find that
the defendant acted maliciously, in 'wanton disregard for the rights of others,' with
'flagrant indifference' to the rights of others, or in an 'outrageous manner' ") (citations
omitted).
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scale, state-sponsored incarceration of innocents is preposterous to
imagine and practically, if not academically, impossible
to recommend. Not even occupying armies feel unconstrained about the
level of communal responsibility they can impose.
The proportionality theme carries some explanatory weight, but
not enough to warrant much more attention. The proportionality
norm may be a useful descriptive (and normative) tool but it is also
one that most citizens are prepared to sacrifice for other goods or
principles when convinced of a worthwhile tradeoff. Plea bargaining itself can be described as interfering with the proportionality
aspiration, and most citizens (and certainly lawmakers) accept plea
bargaining as a worthwhile evil or even as a genuine good. One
important difference may be that plea bargaining bends the rule of
proportionality by generating some low punishments (for those
who plead), whereas overextraction departs from the ideal in the
other direction. On the other hand, plea bargaining must surely
involve prosecutorial threats of large punishments-and thus deviations from the proportionality norm-for those who go to trial.
Plea bargaining and overextraction can therefore both be said to
depart from the proportionality norm (and perhaps in the same
direction), and yet only plea bargaining has experienced evolutionary success.
C. Side Deals
One possible problem with the overextraction rule is that it
might subsidize wrongdoing if the wrongdoer can convince other
members of the group that he will behave irrationally unless the
group rewards him. In the elevator case, for example, the true
thief might contact one or two other passengers 77 and promise to
return the wallet containing the money in return for $100. If the
implicit threat is credible, the innocent passenger might pay $100 to
the threat-maker in order to retrieve the $150 already paid to the
stakeholder. If there is reason to fear such side deals, then the
overextraction idea could easily do more harm than good.
77 The thief would not want to hustle all passengers because if more than one target runs
to the police, the wrongdoer will run a serious risk of prosecution. I imagine the
sophisticated wrongdoer choosing one vulnerable fellow passenger as a mark. If the
overextraction plan is carried out immediately, see supra text accompanying note 42, such
tailored threats are unlikely to be made.
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It is always difficult to evaluate the credibility of such threats
because so much depends on the victim's and criminal's attitudes
toward various types of risk and on the threat-maker's persuasiveness. And it is difficult to see why a threat to behave "irrationally"
should be taken more seriously than many other threats which
would unravel familiar legal rules.
The obvious problem with this threat from the wrongdoer's point
of view is that the target will know that the overextraction rule
makes it worthwhile for the wrongdoer to return the wallet if the
target ignores the threat. Consider what the target must believe in
order to pay the $100 as demanded. The target must believe that
the threat-maker is truly the wrongdoer and thus in control of the
overextraction fund; that the threat-maker will really fail to return
the wallet if the target refuses to pay as advised; and that the
threat-maker will return the wallet if the target pays as instructed.
The latter condition is itself a serious obstacle because if the threatmaker has recklessly threatened more than one target, 78 then once
the target believes the second condition, the target must also
believe that other threatened targets will pay as instructed. If such
threats were legal we could imagine making them credible, but it is
difficult for a threat-maker who must avoid detection to overcome
the obstacles to collection and incredibility.
For the prospect of this threat to explain the absence of an overextraction rule, we must think that the overextraction rule would
itself add significantly to the likelihood and success of such threats.
An enterprising criminal might simply call randomly selected citizens or accost fellow passengers in elevators with the threat of
inflicting bodily harm in the future unless some payment is made.
There is some chance that these threats will be believed, and some
chance that bodily harm will occasionally be inflicted if only to
make such threats more credible in the future, but there is little
reason to think that the leverage offered by the overextracted pool
of money adds much to a criminal threat-maker's arsenal. Some
credibility may be added by the fact of the prior pickpocketing,
because the target knows that the threat-maker is likely to be the
same person and has reason to believe, therefore, that the threatmaker is in fact a person capable of a calculated crime. But the
78

See. supra note 77 (explaining why such behavior would be reckless).
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same is true of any random threat-maker who adduces evidence of
his criminal past.
A similar problem is that the victim might threaten other passengers, perhaps simply by telling them of the crime and asking for
compensation, agreeing in return not to report the crime.7 9 Passengers who fear that overextraction will be unsuccessful might be
tempted to pay for the threat-maker's silence. But again, it is difficult to see why this threat should be more credible than other random threats. The target knows that if the victim does report the
wrong, the victim must risk at least as much as the target, 0 and
there is no reason for the target to think that the victim is really
more optimistic about the success of the overextraction scheme.
than is the target.
A different sort of threat may be associated with both overextractive liability and moderate group. liability. Faced with group
liability (of either twenty dollars or $150, following the theft of
$100), one passenger might threaten another with a false accusation unless the target pays some amount to the threat-maker. Inasmuch as such individualized fingerpointing may only confuse the
matter (because other passengers meanwhile also report things,
real or manufactured, in an attempt to shift liability), the best
threat might involve two or more passengers' colluding in order to
implicate another. Such collusive arrangements might aim to place
blame on a particular passenger or might take the form of a threat
in order to extract a side payment from the target (perhaps to
cover the group liability). At a bare minimum there is the problem
that passengers facing group liability, rather than no liability, will
shade their testimony in ways that implicate an innocent passenger.
In short, secondary wrongdoing is surely more likely in the face of
group liability than not, 8' but again the incremental effect of group
liability on threat-making (or generating false accusations) seems
79 In a setting different from the elevator, a "victim" might be able to identify fellow
group members in advance and threaten to report a fictitious crime. This strategy is
particularly dangerous if advanced against more than one target.
80 See supra Part II.A for discussion regarding whether the victim should contribute the
same amount as other group members or some multiple of this amount.
81 Theoretically, threats are problematic even where there is no group liability because
the victim might pay one passenger to substantiate a story accusing a third passenger. But
it seems that there is a kind of endowment effect working in threats, or at least in shaded
testimony. It may be easier to influence the testimony of an "innocent" passenger when
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rather small. I would be surprised if a serious objection to Ybarra
(or to overextraction) was that it encouraged wrongful, collusive
side deals among defendants. If threat-making is a greater problem for the overextraction scheme, it must be because that threat
could be credible without collusion among two players. The collusion that is necessary to make the second kind of threat or false
testimony work is largely controlled by the increased danger to
each threat-maker (or false testifier) from bringing in an
accomplice.'
In sum, I am inclined to think that although there are interesting
side deals to consider in the shadow of an overextraction scheme,
these destructive arrangements seem not to be encouraged by
overextraction itself. Indeed, it is possible that problematic threats
are equally likely with Ybarra-style liability,83 and such threats may
be a far more serious problem in everyday life where there is no
particular prospect of group liability, but simply risk averse, vulnerable citizens. On the other hand, because side deals and the credibility of threats are sufficiently difficult to evaluate,8" we might
that passenger is already threatened with liability in the event that no single "wrongdoer"
can be identified.
82 There is also the less pernicious possibility that the victim will despair as the deadline
for confession approaches if the overextraction scheme is one in which immediate
confession is not required. See supra text accompanying note 42 (discussing need for
immediate confessions in some settings to prevent strategic behavior by wrongdoer). The
victim cannot be permitted simply to withdraw the claim (or otherwise undo the
overextraction scheme) because wrongdoers will then delay or decline to return what they
have taken. But the victim is often uniquely situated-and needs no accomplice-to
reproduce what has been taken and to "return" this reproduction to the stakeholder in
order to gain the return of the larger, overextracted amount. To guard against this
problem, the stakeholder might at the outset announce not only the length of the waiting
period in which the wrongdoer can return what has been taken, but also that the return of
the stolen property will not be disclosed until the end of the period. In this way there will
be little reason for the victim to change strategies prior to the end of the waiting period.
83 The greater liability associated with the overextraction rule is likely to encourage
attempts to. assign blame. On the other hand, this liability is uncertain, and innocent
passengers may therefore simply await confession by the wrongdoer. In contrast, although
the Ybarra rule leaves open the possibility that "true" information will be forced out (so
that liability is again uncertain), an "innocent" passenger may think this relatively unlikely
and may therefore be more tempted to shift blame with false testimony.
84 For example, in the absence of contrary data, one might have reasoned that blackmail
and kidnapping (or even terrorism in general) were crimes not worth worrying about.
Blackmailers must suffer from the problem of convincing their targets that they will not
repeat the threat. And kidnappers not only must arrange for an untraceable transfer of
funds but also must convince their targets that they have reason to return the victim alive
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allow for the possibility that overextraction rules have not materialized because of these threats. Similarly, the scope of more mod-

est group liability may itself be dictated by a combination of the

85
problems of side deals, threats and false claims.

D. Insurability
A potential clue to the puzzle before us is that an overextraction
rule needs to block or forbid insurance coverage for overextraction. The key element of the overextraction idea is of course that
the rational wrongdoer will prefer confession over retention of ill-

gotten gains, and this element will be missing if an insurer bears
overextractive liability. Thus, an overextraction rule would require
some expansion of the class of judicially or legislatively uninsurable
risks.

86

Insurance usually blunts socially constructive incentives, but
such insurance is nevertheless not generally barred. Risk aversion
is apparently a competing, if private, good. Thus, we discourage
such things as excessively fast driving and environmental pollution
(perhaps without making additional requests). Apparently, there is much to be understood
about credible threats.
85 The suggestion is that Ybarra-like liability rarely extends to cases involving
unconnected individuals because of the problem associated with such threats. More
simply, legal systems may prefer broad, de facto group liability over refined Ybarra-style
liability because an apparent advantage of the latter-its ability to provide compensation
to victims-is the source of concern about false claims.
A related possibility is that the potential for threats creates a chilling, or activity-level,
problem of the kind discussed but perhaps underestimated in Part I.A. It should be noted,
however, that our civil liability system presents many opportunities for similar liability and
threats; although these costs may in fact deter economic activity, they have not done so in a
dramatic way, and they have not caused important changes in the rules themselves.
86 Put differently, if Ybarra were extended to the case in which the harm done in the
operating room were intentionally inflicted (but it was impossible to know by whom),
insurance would still likely cover the group liability thus imposed. To make the
overextraction rule work we would need a rule barring insurance (or indemnification or
other contractual alternatives) for liability arising out of an overextraction scheme.
The noninsurability of virtually all criminal liability (even where there was no intent to
cause injury) is itself noteworthy. Perhaps we are willing to see deterrence (as championed
by tort law) dulled because of the offsetting utility of risk reduction, but we are tnwilling to
let retribution (the stuff of criminal law) be blunted because something more than risk and
utility is at stake. It is also possible that once insurance institutions arose, criminal
penalties came to be relied on as an important source of deterrence precisely because a
clear line could be drawn between remedies that could and could not be spread and
avoided.
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with a combination of criminal penalties and potential tort liability.
The latter deterrence mechanism is blunted by the availability-or
in the case of driving the requirement-of insurance coverage,
although we may count on insurers to supply their own incentives
to promote safe deportment. The criminal penalties, however, represent uninsurable risks. Intentional torts are sometimes also said
to be uninsurable,8 7 but it is really only the intent to cause injury
that interferes with insurability; a great deal of insurable tort liability arises out of intentional wrongdoing (such as speeding). Group
liability of the Ybarra kind, arising out of injuries sustained in
operating rooms or elevators or elsewhere, is also insurable under
present contractual practices and legal rules. This insurability
weakens, but does not ruin, the information-forcing element of
modest group liability, and we are apparently willing to tolerate
reduced deterrence incentives in exchange for the private gains
from risk spreading.
In terms of the comparison between moderate and overextractive group liability, the relative evolutionary success of moderate
group liability (despite certain advantages of overextraction) can
be explained with reference to the fact that only overextraction is
incapable of tolerating insurance. Elevator passengers and factories along a (polluted) river would need to be barred from insuring
against overextraction, and we do not generally bar insurance
except where there is proof of serious wrongdoing (by the wouldbe insured) or immediate danger of moral hazard. We may be
unwilling to impose penalties that are uninsurable when liability is
based not only on something less than the criminal law standard,
but also when liability is based on mere fortuity. Put differently,
the risk imposed by the overextraction rule on innocent players is
unacceptably great-especially or precisely because it cannot be
reduced through insurance. A scheme that will not work if insurance is permitted may simply be unacceptable-unless its burdens
fall only on those who are found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
or who intentionally do harm.

87 Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law § 5A(d)(1), at 518-19 (1988)
(stating that covered losses are those that are "accidental" not intentional).

HeinOnline -- 81 Va. L. Rev. 1601 1995

1602

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 81:1561

E. Individual Responsibility Revisited
I have already suggested that even (nonoverextractive) modest
group liability is more likely where businesses rather than individuals are concerned. It is easy to grow accustomed to liability for
environmental injuries even where there is no evidence that the
particular defendant behaved negligently or caused the injury in
question. In contrast, if personal property disappears from a law
school library, it is almost impossible to imagine that all who used
the library during the hours in which the wrongdoing occurred
would be required to compensate the victim. There are at least
three distinct ways of explaining this difference. First, as suggested
earlier,8 lawmakers (and commentators) may discount the hidden
costs that fall on businesses while identifying strongly with the burdens imposed on individual defendants. Second, individual-but
not corporate or enterprise-liability may be associated with a
moral taint, especially where the wrongdoing is intentional, and the
law may decline,to stigmatize individuals where the identity of the
wrongdoers is uncertain. Third, there may be no liability where the
gain from satisfying risk averse preferences is likely to exceed any
gain from an inexact deterrence scheme.8 9 At least two of these
explanations suggest some hesitation to use group liabilityincluding vicarious liability and products liability-where enterprises are concerned.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The insurability of some group liability-but not of overextractive liability-is an important means of understanding the absence
of overextraction and, more practically, the limits of Ybarra. But I
have not developed the overextraction idea simply to offer solutions to the puzzle of its nonexistence. When a teacher reacts to
juvenile misbehavior from an unknown source by penalizing the
entire class with a missed recess, I do think the teacher is missing
the superior alternative of adding to the threat of group liability a
promise that if the wrongdoer confesses convincingly the wrong88 See supra Part llI.A.
89 For instance, students and faculty who use a library may escape liability for missing
items in the same way that the stockholders of a corporation enjoy limited liability.
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doer alone will miss half the recess period. 90 That the overextraction idea could easily be used in this and in other circumstancesbut is not-is itself something of a puzzle. It may well be that

there is a failure of imagination or that it is difficult to innovate
when it comes to the infliction of penalties. 91 Alternatively, it may
be that in classrooms, armies, occupied territories, prisons, and
other settings where activity-level effects are least worrisome, it is

also the case that shared goals or other bonds among members of
the target group overpower the incentive to confess offered by any
overextraction rule.

In the larger world of law, the overextraction idea may be most
promising in dealing with polluters. In the case of a polluted

waterway, for example, the key ingredients of successful overextraction may be present: uncertainty as to the wrongdoer's identity;

nominal activity-level effects; modest judgment-proof problems;
and a target group with members that do not rally to one another's
causes, that can self-insure, and that often elicit little political

sympathy.
The greater part of this Article has concentrated on the puzzles
associated with the overextraction idea. An examination of a rule
not taken can sometimes illuminate the tools we do use and the

90 In order for this strategy to deter future wrongdoing, the wrongdoer must prefer the
half recess to the pleasure associated with the wrongdoing. Note that the absence of
anonymity may be useful here if the wrongdoer's peers regard the wrongdoer as
courageous and loyal when his confession restores to the class their recess period. But if
peer pressure runs in the other direction, the teacher could offer the confessor a penalty
comparable to the partially missed recess, but one that preserves anonymity. Finally, the
example assumes that a convincing confession is possible. Thus, if the teacher finds an
illicit note, confession might require the complementary piece of paper from which the
note paper was torn.
91 As a legal matter, innovative penalties can be attacked as cruel and unusual. It is
revealing, perhaps, that "unusual" is regarded as a bad thing when it comes to
punishments. As an evolutionary matter, I think it safe to say that there is less willingness
to think about innovative penalties (especially when imposed by the state on politically
unprotected parties) than novel forms of reward. Of course, to the extent that wrongdoers
may be judgment-proof, there is less room to innovate in the case of penalties than there is
with rewards, where innovation often comes in the form of new opportunities for monetary
reward. Still, the disinclination to innovate where penalties are concerned is noteworthy
because there is also a general inclination to think that the penalties currently meted out
generate enormous social costs, do little in the way of rehabilitation, and can be quite
horrible and offensive in practice.
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values behind these choices. 92 In this case, an analysis of the
problems associated with overextraction serves to explain the
scope of modest group liability (of the Ybarra kind). At the same
time, there is the remote possibility that if the cost of undetected
wrongful behavior grows, so that de facto communal liability
increases, the alternative of overextraction will in some circumstances become more appealing. The greatest obstacle to such
experimentation would appear to be the requirement that we
change our expectations about risk bearing and our rules governing
those risks that can be shared through insurance schemes. If these
or other obstacles discussed in this Article are too formidable, then
the point of this thought experiment will have been to understand
better the limited rold of explicit group responsibility.

92 In some sense the real subject of this project is "Rules not Taken." See
Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. Legal Stud. 265 (1993); Saul
Obligation or Restitution for Best Efforts, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1411 (1994).
common to these projects, and to several forthcoming papers as well, is that by
the paths not taken, we can learn a good deal about the legal rules we know.
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